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This article briefly assesses the nature 
and impact of inequality in New Zealand 
using the evidence from the IHSP. It then 
discusses the policy options that need to 
be considered in order to reduce income 
inequality and the corresponding health 
and social impacts. The New Zealand 
Council of Christian Social Services 
(NZCCSS) has been working to analyse 
the impacts of income inequality through 
its Closer Together Whakatata Mai 
programme and detailed analysis of the 
data for each of the indicators in New 
Zealand can be found on the website 
www.closertogether.org.nz.
New Zealand is at a significant point 
in the overall social and economic policy 
debate. The lingering effects of the 
economic recession, plans for significant 
welfare reform, and a government 
committed to restraining expenditure 
growth, especially in health, welfare, 
housing and education, make it unlikely 
Professors Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett in The Spirit 
Level (2010) have documented the relationship between 
income inequality and health and social dysfunction across 25 
developed countries including New Zealand, and summarised 
their findings in their Index of Health and Social Problems 
(IHSP). The results of this work show that New Zealand is 
performing poorly in comparison to countries with lower 
levels of income inequality. Their research has prompted 
debate in New Zealand (see Policy Quarterly issues of May and 
August 2011), and an example of the influence of their work 
can be seen in the references and measures chosen for the 
Treasury’s Living Standards Framework released in May 2011. 
Inequality cannot simply be explained as wrong choices or behaviours. Inequality of resources and 
opportunity are powerful background forces. In order to get ahead, people need more equal access 
to resources – more income and wealth equality creates more equal opportunity for everyone in 
society. (National Equality Panel, 2010)
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that poverty can be reduced in the 
short term and more likely that income 
inequality will grow further. Social service 
agencies are responding every day to the 
needs of people who bear the burden 
of our ongoing social problems (see 
NZCCS, 2011). There is an urgent need to 
design effective policies that will reduce 
the inequalities that are key contributors 
to these social problems.  
High levels of income inequality have 
a pervasive effect which reduces or even 
negates the effectiveness of other policy 
interventions, such as targeted assistance 
programmes. The evidence is very strong 
that reducing economic inequality is an 
effective way to improve many key areas 
of health and social well-being. To quote 
the recent Marmot Review in Britain: 
‘Although there is far more to inequality 
than just income, income is linked 
to life chances in a number of salient 
ways’ (Marmot, 2010). Reducing income 
inequality is not the only solution, but it 
is a powerful tool in the policy maker’s 
tool kit; the policy options available to 
reduce inequality are discussed below. 
Appeals to principles such as fairness, 
equity, justice and human rights or 
to enlightened self-interest highlight 
the fact that the debate about income 
inequality is also a test of our values as 
a society. Recent work on social attitudes 
to inequality sheds some light on where 
New Zealanders currently stand on these 
issues and suggests that there is support 
for reducing inequality. Evidence on its 
own does not settle the social and political 
debate, but failing to take account of a 
large and coherent body of evidence is 
undoubtedly a mistake. 
New Zealand and inequality
Wilkinson and Pickett use ten measures in 
relation to income inequality for the IHSP. 
Figure 1 shows that New Zealand fits the 
international pattern among developed 
countries. Our high level of income 
inequality is associated with poorer health 
and social outcomes across our whole 
population. 
New Zealand data were available for 
nine of the ten indicators. Data on social 
mobility are not available, although some 
limited data has been published recently 
(Gibbons, 2010). The overall rankings for 
New Zealand are shown in Figure 2.
Increasing inequality has been 
accompanied by worsening social 
outcomes:
• The prevalence of mental health 
problems in New Zealand is more than 
twice that in more equal countries 
such as Japan and Spain. 
• The prevalence of obesity is rising 
and is more than double that of 
more equal countries such as Sweden 
or Norway. Obesity is a major risk 
factor for diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease, as well as some common 
types of cancer. 
• Teenage pregnancies are higher. New 
Zealand’s teenage birth rate is five 
times higher than that of countries 
with lower inequality, such Sweden.
• Imprisonment rates have doubled in 
this country since the mid-1980s and 
we lock up people at more than three 
times the rate of countries such as 
Japan and Finland.
• Overall life expectancy continues to 
rise, but New Zealand continues to 
rank poorly compared with more 
equal countries. 
• Infant mortality is falling but our 
overall rate is high, and we compare 
poorly with more equal countries 
that have been able to reduce infant 
mortality at a faster rate. 
• Maths and literacy average 
performance is high, but the same 
data shows that New Zealand has the 
highest level of inequality in education 
outcomes in the OECD (Treasury, 
2011).
• Social mobility comparisons are 
not available because there is no 
internationally comparable evidence 
about the impact of income inequality 
on social mobility in New Zealand. A 
recent Treasury working paper using 
proxy data on social status was not 
Figure 2: Index of health and social 
problems – rankings
Key indicator
NZ 
ranking
No of 
countries
Imprisonment 20 23
Teenage births 19 21
Obesity 13 21
Infant mortality 21 22
Mental illness 9 12
Life expectancy 16 24
Trust 6 23
Maths and 
literacy 5 21
Homicide 6 23
Social mobility No ranking
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Figure 1: Index of health and social problems
Source: Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010
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able to make any definitive conclusion 
(Gibbons, 2010). 
Despite high income inequality, New 
Zealand performs well comparatively on 
other indicators:
• The level of trust is still high and not 
showing any signs of declining. 
• Our homicide rate compares 
favourably with that in other 
countries; it is difficult, however, to 
conduct effective comparisons of 
other data on violence. 
There is also a strong relationship 
between inequality and poverty. 
Continuing high inequality affects 
life chances, health, education and 
employment opportunities, and hinders 
effects to reduce poverty, especially child 
poverty (Dale et al., 2011). A detailed 
analysis of the source data and the New 
Zealand evidence is available on the 
website www.closertogether.org.nz. 
Income inequality in New Zealand
New Zealand has one of the highest rates 
of income inequality among developed 
or wealthy countries, ranking 17th out 
of the 21 countries ranked by Wilkinson 
and Pickett. Their index uses income 
inequality figures from the United Nations 
Human Development Report 2006, based 
on a 20:20 ratio which calculates the ratio 
of the richest 20% of income earners to 
the lowest 20% of incomes. Figures are 
household incomes after tax and transfers, 
adjusted for the number of people in each 
household. 
Using a different measure (the Gini 
coefficient), inequality is seen to have 
increased faster in New Zealand than in 
any other OECD country over the two 
decades 1985–2005 (see Figure 3), while 
some OECD countries, such as France, 
Ireland and Spain, experienced reduced 
inequality (OECD, 2008). 
Most of the increase was due to 
large rises in the incomes of the top 
20% of income earners. The incomes of 
the bottom 20% actually decreased over 
the two decades from the mid-1980s 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2010). 
Over that time, the rich got richer while 
the poor quite literally got poorer.
The increase in inequality occurred 
mainly between the mid-1980s and the 
mid-1990s. During the following decade 
the increase slowed. Since the mid-2000s 
income inequality in New Zealand has 
decreased slightly, due largely to the 
impact of the government’s Working 
For Families package (Perry, 2011), and 
the latest data show a drop in income 
inequality in the year to June 2010. Income 
inequality is still, however, embedded at 
rates well above those of the mid-1980s. 
The most recent comparative data from 
the OECD are from 2008–2009 and place 
New Zealand as around the tenth most 
unequal country in the OECD (Perry, 
2011). This reflects the trend of increasing 
income inequality across the most of the 
OECD (OECD, 2011). 
The effects of the October 2010 income 
tax cuts and related tax policy changes are 
not included in the latest New Zealand 
data. The increase in New Zealand 
Superannuation which was introduced 
in October 2008 as part of the 2008 tax 
changes appears to have contributed to 
a rise in income for the lower income 
deciles (where superannuitants are 
strongly represented). At the same time, 
there is a drop in the highest two income 
deciles, due to a loss of investment income 
(Perry, 2010). 
Critics of The Spirit Level analysis
The critics who have challenged the 
methodology used by Wilkinson and Pickett, 
such as Saunders (2010) and Snowden 
(2010), have been well responded to (e.g. 
Noble, 2010). The statistical robustness of 
Pickett’s and Wilkinson’s work is strong and 
reliable. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
commissioned an independent review of the 
research on income inequality from a United 
Kingdom perspective. This review, conducted 
by Professor Karen Rowlingson from the 
University of Birmingham, confirms that 
there is a strong correlation between income 
inequality and the ten health and social 
indicators identified in the Index of Health 
and Social Problems (Rowlingson, 2011). 
The extent of the causal relationship 
between income inequality and health 
and social problems is the real focus of 
debate, because this also influences the 
policy choices to respond to inequality. 
Causal relationships independent of 
other factors vary between indicators, but 
the effect is real. Rowlingson concludes 
that the evidence is strong about the 
negative impacts of income inequality, 
and, conversely, that there is virtually 
no evidence that increasing income 
inequality produces any positive effects 
(Rowlingson, 2011). In a similar vein, the 
New Zealand Treasury has acknowledged 
the importance of distributional issues 
in their work: ‘While empirical evidence 
of causation remains inconclusive, both 
historical and contemporary events 
demonstrate that societies in which 
the benefits of growth are captured 
by a minority can face considerable 
social, economic and political upheaval’ 
(Treasury, 2011).
Drivers of inequality
Income inequality across most of the 
OECD countries rose over the two decades 
from the  mid-1980s to the mid-2000s and 
appears to be converging at a common 
and higher average. In other words, other 
Figure 3: Gini Coefficient (Treasury, 2011)
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and mid 2000s than in any other OECD country inequality has stablised 
recently and is about 7th highest in the OECD
Source: OECD (2008) and Statistics New Zealand (2011a)
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OECD countries are ‘catching up’ to New 
Zealand when it comes to increasing 
inequality. The OECD points to three 
broad drivers of the growing inequality 
developed countries (OECD, 2011):
• Globalisation, skill-based techno-
logical progress and institutional 
and regulatory reforms have all had 
an impact on the distribution of 
earnings.
• Changes in family formation and 
household structures have had an 
impact on households earnings and 
inequality (e.g. a rising number of 
single-person/sole-parent families).
• Tax and benefits systems have 
changed the distribution of household 
incomes.
The deregulation of the New 
Zealand economy over recent decades, 
especially in labour markets and trade 
protection, has opened up wage earners 
to direct competition from lower-income 
countries. This has had the effect of 
holding wage increases down for low-
income earners. Family structure in 
New Zealand is undergoing significant 
change, with a rising number of smaller 
households and sole-parent households. 
Our tax and benefits systems have 
undergone significant change: the top 
income tax rate has been reduced from 
66% in the mid-1980s to 30% by 2011, 
and benefits were reduced by up to 20% 
in 1991 and have been maintained at that 
level since. 
The increase in income inequality 
in New Zealand over the past 25 years 
has been characterised by a large rise in 
the incomes of the top 20% of income 
earners and static or declining incomes 
for the lowest 20%. Most households 
in the lowest 20% of incomes are either 
reliant on benefits or earning close to 
the minimum wage. While benefit levels 
have remained static, the pay rates of 
executives and chief executives have been 
increasing rapidly (see Boyle and Roberts, 
2004; Strategic Pay, 2008).
Ma-ori inequality: a colonial legacy 
Distinctive to the New Zealand profile 
of inequality is the place of the tangata 
whenua. The Treaty of Waitangi 
guaranteed the legal rights of Mäori and 
their ownership of lands and taonga – 
assets and material and cultural resources. 
But the legacy of colonial policies that 
disempowered Mäori and alienated 
them from their land and economic base 
continues to define the position of Mäori 
in New Zealand society. Despite positive 
developments in recent decades, Mäori 
face massive challenges to building an 
economic, social and cultural base that 
can ensure well-being on terms that are 
acceptable to them. Mäori bear an unfair 
burden of the health and social costs of 
inequality: they experience much higher 
rates of infectious disease among children, 
higher imprisonment rates, higher rates 
of mental illness and poorer education 
outcomes. 
Indeed, the whole equality analysis 
is strongly criticised in some quarters 
as simply a continuation of the colonial 
mentality. Current ways of measuring 
inequality, poverty and disadvantage are 
seen to ‘fail’ Mäori and Pacific children. 
The ‘welfarism’ of the current system, 
based on economic welfare, material 
well-being and limited human agency, 
is criticised (Henare et al., 2011). The 
current inequality measures compare 
Mäori with non-Mäori and represent a 
‘colonising’ approach. Henare et al. call 
for a new ‘dedicated well-being survey’, 
with questions designed to reflect the 
capabilities approach promoted by 
Armatya Sen and used in measures such as 
the United Nations Human Development 
Index.  The move to develop the Whänau 
Ora approach to social services as a 
holistic response based in Mäori tikanga 
has been influenced by the desire to free 
Mäori from this perceived dependence 
on a Päkehä-driven welfare model. 
Policies to reduce income inequality
Deputy Prime Minister Bill English, 
responding to questions about income 
equality in Parliament on behalf of the 
prime minister, commented that he does 
not accept the view that New Zealand is 
a deeply unequal country, but, he said, 
‘the big issue about inequality is what we 
do about it’ (New Zealand Parliament, 15 
June 2011). 
Achieving a sustained and meaningful 
reduction in income inequality (and wider 
socio-economic inequality) requires long-
term policies aimed at raising the incomes 
of the lowest income earners while at 
the same time moderating increases 
of higher incomes. There are various 
policy options that could achieve this, 
and public debate needs to be informed 
by accurate information about these 
options and their impacts. Wilkinson 
and Pickett point out that the social 
and economic policies of, for example, 
Japan and Sweden are very different yet 
both have relatively low levels of income 
inequality and good social outcomes. 
The New Zealand experience of income 
inequality has common features with 
other developed economies, but also our 
own distinctive experience. 
Changing our attitudes to inequality
Our social attitudes are caught in the 
tension between believing that people 
Figure 4: Income inequality New Zealand (Gini coefficient)
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should take responsibility for themselves 
and thinking that the government should 
take responsibility to make sure everyone 
is provided for. Research from the New 
Zealand Values Survey reports that 
the majority of people prefer to blame 
the poor for their poverty. The survey 
respondents thought people were in need 
because of ‘laziness’ and ‘lack of will-
power’ rather than because ‘society treats 
them unfairly’. 
On the other hand, nearly two thirds 
of people in the survey thought it was the 
government’s responsibility to reduce the 
income difference between the rich and 
poor. They were also willing to pay more 
taxes to fund health services, education, 
pensions, job training and assistance 
for the unemployed and those on lower 
incomes (Carroll et al., 2011). These results 
align with other recent research by the 
International Social Survey Programme 
(2010), where a similar proportion of 
people said that income differences in 
this country are too large. 
Research has also been undertaken 
in the United Kingdom on people’s 
attitudes to inequality and how it might 
be possible to build a public consensus 
about tackling inequality (Bamfield and 
Horton, 2009). Both the New Zealand 
and UK research shows that people tend 
to have more negative and judgemental 
attitudes towards the poor than towards 
the rich. There does not appear to be 
much evidence to support the so-called 
‘tall poppy syndrome’. People tend to 
respect wealth as a measure of success and 
believe that it is mostly deserved. From 
the UK research it appears that people 
are more willing to support policies based 
on ‘proportionate universalism’, designed 
so that most people receive some benefit 
from government programmes as long as 
most benefit is directed towards the more 
disadvantaged. Therefore, the political 
challenge is to design policies which 
recognise that ‘reducing inequalities is 
about fairness and self-interest’ (Carroll 
et al., 2011). 
The three R’s: restraint, regulation  
and redistribution
Accordingly, the policy mix needed to 
address income inequality must negotiate 
the inherent tensions between individual 
self-responsibility and government 
responsibilities to ensure fairness. 
Broadly speaking, approaches to reducing 
inequality can be characterised as a 
combination of a culture of restraint, a 
commitment to good regulation and 
effective income redistribution. In Japan, 
a culture of restraint from those on 
higher incomes has been combined with 
a traditional commitment to ensuring 
comparatively modest differences in 
earnings between employees and their 
managers and executives. In contrast, 
Sweden has focused more strongly on 
redistributing income via taxation and 
government transfers, to ensure adequate 
income for those on lower incomes. Both 
Sweden and Japan share a historical 
commitment to ensuring high levels of 
employment. New Zealand can learn 
from these examples in finding its path to 
reducing inequality. 
Employment growth
The current government believes that 
developing a strong economy that 
produces jobs and opportunity is its main 
priority. This can only reduce inequality, 
however, if people moving off benefits 
actually move into employment and earn 
more than what they would receive on 
a benefit. Paid employment also brings 
with it entitlement to transfers such as 
Working for Families tax credits. The 
effectiveness of increased employment in 
reducing income inequality is conditional 
on there being sufficient employment 
opportunities at rates of pay that actually 
do increase household incomes. It does 
not address income inequalities of those 
who are already in employment or the 
incomes of households relying on benefits 
for their income. 
Industrial democracy
The decline in union membership has 
mirrored the rise in income inequality 
in New Zealand. The ability of workers 
to organise and bargain for better wages 
and conditions was greatly reduced after 
the introduction of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. Although the act was 
replaced by the Employment Relations 
Act 2000, which brought in some changes 
to improve opportunities for collective 
bargaining, union membership remains 
a fraction of what it was during the mid-
1980s before the structural reforms were 
introduced (Department of Labour, 
2009). A recent International Monetary 
Fund paper (Kumhof and Ranciere, 
2010) notes the significance of employee 
bargaining power in achieving reductions 
in wage inequality. 
Wilkinson and Pickett point to other 
forms of industrial democracy, such as 
shared employee ownership, that could 
act as vehicles for greater income equality 
by allowing employees direct share in the 
returns from their work. 
A culture of restraint
Rediscovering a culture of restraint on the 
part of those in leadership in business, 
local and central government based on 
restraint, and transparency in setting 
remuneration for directors, executives 
and senior management could help 
change the inequality dynamics. In Japan 
it has proved possible for businesses to 
be highly successful while maintaining 
comparatively low differentials between 
the highest- and lowest-paid employees. It 
is clear that it requires a change in attitude 
from those in leadership to recognise the 
greater good in restraining differences to 
fair and reasonable levels. Organisations 
could explore using ratios in setting pay 
scales to ensure that the lowest paid are 
not left behind as executive pay increases.
High Pay Commission
Researchers have found that people greatly 
underestimate the differences in incomes 
in New Zealand, and we are tolerating 
ever greater difference (International 
Social Survey Programme, 2010). There 
is a need to talk about and agree on what 
level of income inequality is ‘fair’. The 
independent High Pay Commission in the 
UK in its initial report asks whether the rise 
in the highest pay rates has led to us paying 
‘more for less’ (High Pay Commission, 
2011). Looking at the top 100 UK-listed 
company executives, the report charts 
the excessive increases in rewards that 
executives have been receiving that bear no 
relation to company performance. Chief 
executive remuneration has quadrupled 
in the past ten years, while share prices 
have fallen. There is little evidence of 
‘executive poaching’ of executives by 
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overseas companies, and neither does 
the risk involved in the roles appear to 
be sufficiently high to justify the huge 
increases in remuneration. Poor oversight 
by company boards and regulatory bodies 
of the remuneration of executives (and 
board members), and lack of shareholder 
power are identified as factors hindering 
attempts to restrain excessive growth in 
executive pay. 
The commission is in the process of 
developing what it describes as a ‘fair 
framework for fair pay’ and it would 
be wise for New Zealand to consider 
a similar process. In New Zealand, the 
Remuneration Authority sets the salaries 
of Members of Parliament and judges 
and is required to consider ‘fairness to the 
taxpayers or ratepayers who ultimately 
foot the bill’ (Remuneration Authority, 
2010). This requirement is not currently 
interpreted as including trying to avoid 
increases in income inequality or trying 
to reduce income inequalities.
Regulation
Forms of regulation and legislation that 
require decision makers to pay attention 
to reducing inequality can work either as a 
minimum ‘safety net’ underpinning agreed 
social consensus (e.g. minimum wage 
legislation), or can help ‘raise the bar’ and 
drive change in a positive direction. The 
minimum wage regulations can be used 
to reduce inequality. The Department of 
Labour reports on the impact of changes 
to the minimum wage on wage inequality, 
and its 2010 report notes that increasing 
the minimum wage to $15 an hour would 
‘strongly improve’ income distribution 
(Department of Labour, 2010). 
It may be appropriate to explore 
regulatory means to manage public 
sector relativities through introducing 
maximum ratios between the highest and 
lowest paid. It has been pointed out that 
currently the mid-point of the top band 
of public sector salaries is around 11 times 
that of the bottom band (Brommell, 
2010). It may be possible to come to a 
consensus on a lower maximum ratio.
Fairness test
Another regulatory approach could be to 
introduce a fairness test, a formal impact 
assessment of all policy and legislation that 
comes before Cabinet and Parliament, in 
the same way Treaty of Waitangi, gender 
and environmental impact statements are 
currently considered. It would involve an 
inequality impact assessment of policies 
and legislation (e.g. tax rises and spending 
cuts) to assess whether they would lead 
to an increase or decrease in inequality 
of incomes, assets or access to services. In 
a similar vein, the UK Equality Act 2010 
required government agencies to show 
‘due regard to the desirability of exercising 
[their functions] in a way designed to 
reduce the inequalities of outcome which 
result from socio-economic disadvantage’. 
(As it happens, this section of the act 
has since been repealed by the current 
coalition government.)  
Redistribution
Redistributing income via the taxation 
system to share income and wealth more 
fairly involves a range of possible policy 
tools. Our current progressive tax system 
is already reasonably effective in reducing 
before-tax income inequalities, reducing 
them by about half (Perry, 2010). Changes 
to the tax system need to be analysed by 
asking whether they increase or decrease 
inequality. Treasury estimated that the 2010 
tax package would not increase income 
inequality (Treasury, 2010). It would be 
a further step to require changes to seek 
actively to decrease income inequality. 
The Working for Families system 
of tax credits is demonstrably the most 
successful policy of the past 25 years in 
reducing income inequality and poverty. 
Its introduction saw income inequality 
fall for the first time in two decades 
(Perry, 2010). Extending the benefits of 
this kind of programme to all families 
with children (i.e.to the unemployed 
and those on welfare benefits) would 
be another significant step by helping 
those on the lowest incomes. The $60 
per week in-work tax credit for families 
in employment with children could 
be changed to a child tax credit for all 
families with children, which would 
have an immediate impact of lifting the 
incomes of lowest-income families and 
reducing inequality. 
Introducing a minimum income free 
of tax is another way to reduce inequality. 
The recent tax changes reduced the initial 
rate from 12.5% to 10.5%, but in Australia, 
for example, the first $6,000 of income 
is tax-free, so New Zealand still has a 
relatively high initial tax rate on the first 
dollar. Calculating the benefits of tax-free 
minimum income policies is made more 
complicated because of the impact of 
the transfers and tax credits low-income 
households receive. The Treasury’s 
2001 tax review looked at the issue and 
concluded that such a policy might well 
deliver more benefit to second-income 
earners in middle- and high-income 
households than it would to those on the 
lowest incomes. 
Universal basic income
The idea of a universal basic income (UBI) 
has been promoted for many years without 
ever having been fully implemented 
(although Canada conducted a significant 
social experiment with it in some regions 
during the 1970s). The idea has been 
brought back into the public debate 
through a proposal for an Unconditional 
Basic Income (Morgan and Guthrie, 2011). 
A UBI has the advantage that it recognises 
and rewards work carried out by people 
in unpaid roles (such as child rearing and 
care of sick, disabled or older people). It 
offers the possibility of simplifying the 
complexities of the welfare system by 
effectively replacing all benefits with a 
UBI. The challenge is to set it at a level 
that lifts people out of poverty while also 
addressing the complexities of meeting 
additional welfare needs beyond the level 
of the UBI. The impact a UBI system would 
have on reducing inequality depends on 
the other tax and welfare policies with 
which it is combined. 
Widening the tax base
The absence of any significant wealth 
taxes in the New Zealand tax system has 
repeatedly been identified as a major gap 
in ensuring tax equity (e.g. Tax Working 
Group, 2010). Widening the tax base to 
include some form of capital gains tax 
or other wealth taxes is an effective way 
to redistribute income and wealth and 
reduce the heavy reliance New Zealand 
has on income tax and GST. The challenge 
in designing a capital gains tax is to make 
it effective in raising revenue and limiting 
tax avoidance. 
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GST and other consumption taxes 
affect most significantly those with the 
lowest incomes because they have to spend 
a higher proportion of their income. The 
2010 increase in GST and associated rises 
in the cost of living hurt low-income 
families hardest. Reducing GST and/
or excluding essential food items from 
GST, or having a reduced rate for them, 
are policy options that would reduce 
hardship for low-income families and 
influence overall socio-economic equity, 
but by nature do not have an impact on 
income inequality because they are taxes 
on consumption, not income. 
New forms of taxation need to be 
considered, including some form of 
financial transaction tax (such as the 
Tobin Tax). Such taxes target speculative 
financial transactions by taking a very 
small percentage (a fraction of a per 
cent) from every transaction. The low 
rate means it has no material impact 
on genuine transactions, but it could 
generate considerable tax revenue from 
the otherwise untaxed large speculative 
transactions. 
Opportunity costs are higher than 
redistribution costs
The costs of doing nothing far outweigh 
the costs of increased tax transfers; this 
is the message of recent reports on child 
poverty (Grimmond, 2011; Dale et al., 
2011). These two reports arrive at a similar 
figure for the overall costs to society and 
the taxpayer of leaving 200,000 children 
in poverty. At least $6–8 billion (3.5–4.5% 
of GDP) is a huge and long-term cost to 
our society. In the debate about the ‘fiscal 
burden’ of reducing inequality we do well 
to compare it to the multi-billion dollar 
price tag of not reducing inequality and 
poverty. 
Conclusion
The evidence suggests that reducing 
income inequality in New Zealand will 
have a range of desirable social outcomes. 
But to achieve such a goal will require a 
careful mix of policies, efforts to promote 
changes in social attitudes (especially 
concerning the acceptability of very high 
incomes), and better access to good-
quality paid employment, particularly for 
those on low incomes. Regulatory activity 
needs to complement voluntary restraint 
through active regulatory oversight of 
board and executive remuneration and use 
of minimum wage regulations to raise the 
lowest incomes. Redistributing income can 
be achieved through a widened tax base, 
including through effective wealth and 
transactions taxes that generate revenue 
sufficient to allow income transfers to 
those not able to earn sufficient income in 
the private market.
The evidence about the advantages 
of reducing income inequality is clear 
and many policy tools are available. 
New Zealanders generally share an 
underlying sense of fairness and appear 
willing to support a range of policies to 
reduce income inequalities. Hence, policy 
makers and those in political leadership 
can be confident that implementing 
policies to increase equality is not merely 
good policy and but will also enjoy public 
support.
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Baker’s article is primarily a literature 
review. We therefore begin by outlining 
some of the key literature in this field that 
was overlooked. Most of this literature is 
easily accessible by using simple search 
techniques such as Google Scholar. Most 
is also freely downloadable. 
An article of our own entitled 
‘Paid parental leave in New Zealand: 
a short history and future policy 
options’ is a puzzling omission, given 
that it was published in 2006, also in 
Policy Quarterly. As indicated in the 
title, our article outlines the history 
of parental leave in New Zealand but, 
more importantly, suggests some future 
options, including some ideas that Baker 
subsequently discusses. This article puts 
into a wider historical context Baker’s 
first sentence, which claims that ‘in 2002, 
New Zealand employees gained access to 
paid parental leave’. While obviously not 
a universal scheme, a limited form of 
paid maternity leave was introduced in 
1948, which was available to some women 
in the public service. Over time, various 
other employers offered their own paid 
maternity, and sometimes parental, leave 
schemes. Then, in 1999, the parental 
tax credit was introduced as part of a 
wider Family Assistance package. This 
was available to qualifying families with 
a child or children born on or after 1 
October 1999. Although the government 
at the time did not support the provision 
of European models of paid parental 
leave, it clearly wished to provide financial 
support to some new parents. 
These developments indicate that 
parental leave policy in New Zealand 
developed over a long period and involved 
incremental change. Thus, a key policy 
question is whether future incremental 
change should continue to be supported 
or whether, in fact, new, more radical 
models of leave should be investigated.
In terms of relevant government 
reports, Baker mentions the report 
on parental leave by the Families 
Commission (2007), but fails to engage 
with two other significant government 
reports. One is the National Advisory 
Council on the Employment of Women’s 
(NACEW) 2008 report entitled Priority 
Improvements to Parental Leave (NACEW, 
2008). Both the Families Commission 
and NACEW reports recommend 
continuing incremental improvements 
to parental leave policy. Perhaps even 
more important is the Office of the 
Children’s Commissioner’s 2011 report 
entitled Through Their Lens: an inquiry 
into non-parental education and care of 
infants and toddlers (Carroll-Lind and 
Angus, 2011). This report engages with 
the difficult issue of determining specific 
policy configurations that are in the best 
interests of children in the first months 
and years of their lives. It raises complex 
issues of whether, especially in times of 
constrained government finances, support 
for the early months of a child’s life should 
take the form primarily of parental leave 
rather than taxpayer supported early 
child care and education. This represents 
a more fundamental shift in thinking 
about parental leave and child care. 
Engagement with the recommendations 
of the government’s Welfare Working 
Group would also have increased the 
policy relevance of Baker’s article. In 
particular, this working group developed 
recommendations about parents’ return 
to work relative to the age of the youngest 
child, an issue which is directly relevant 
to parental leave policies.
But we consider that there are also 
other important omissions. While 
referred to indirectly through mention 
of a television news item, there is no in-
depth engagement with the Child Poverty 
Action Group’s important background 
paper Paid Parental Leave in New 
Paid Parental Leave Policy  
– A Response to Maureen Baker
Paul Callister and Judith Galtry
In the August 2011 issue of Policy Quarterly, Maureen Baker sets out to 
outline ‘Key issues in parental leave policy’. One aim of the article was to 
examine ‘some of the continuing debates about paid parental leave’. However, 
we argue that the article fails to advance debates about paid parental leave 
in New Zealand, because: 1) it does not adequately engage with recent 
national and international literature; 2) it lacks new empirical evidence; 3) 
its theoretical basis is confused; and 4) no clear, new policy directions are 
promoted.
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Zealand: catching up with Australia? (St 
John and Familton, 2011). It is necessary 
to consider Australia, if only because of 
New Zealand’s strong labour market flow 
across the Tasman. Other studies that we 
believe the author should have considered 
include a number of our own, such as 
Galtry (1995, 1997, 2002 and 2003), Galtry 
and Callister (2005) and Callister and 
Galtry (2009). But even if Baker chose 
not to engage with the ideas presented in 
these particular studies, there are the New 
Zealand studies of James (2009), Forbes 
(2009) and Brough et al., (2009). Then 
there are relevant overseas studies. In 
Australia, Baird wrote an excellent article 
in 2004 setting out various typologies 
for parental leave at the same time that 
Australia was designing its own scheme. 
Finally, while the article notes the work of 
UNICEF when comparing leave schemes 
internationally, a significant paper by Ray 
et al., (2010) entitled Who cares? Assessing 
generosity and gender equality in parental 
leave policy designs in 21 countries is not 
referred to. Between these papers, all the 
issues that Baker raises in her own paper, 
as well as other important issues, are 
discussed. It would have been useful to 
build on this previous work. 
A lack of evidence and misleading 
statements
Here, we focus on a number of statements 
about the labour market, as well as men 
and parental leave, that are not backed by 
evidence or seem to be misleading. As an 
initial example, highlighted on page 59, 
there is the statement ‘leaving employment 
for child bearing and returning years 
later was feasible for women when 
labour markets were expanding in the 
1960s, enabling them to re-enter more 
easily’. There is no evidence presented 
in support of this statement. In fact, it 
is unclear how entry into and exit from 
the labour market in the 1960s could be 
assessed given that are no data sets, such 
as the current LEED data, which allow 
such rates to be calculated.1 However, 
indirect measures cast doubt on Baker’s 
statement. While there was growth in 
employment for women in the 1960s, even 
by the end of that decade just under 40% 
of women were employed. In contrast, 
by mid-2011 just under 60% of women 
were employed, with much of the growth 
occurring amongst women with young 
children. While these data do not indicate 
ease of re-entry, they do indicate a more 
expansive labour market for women in 
recent times. In addition, a raft of public 
and private policies supporting parents, 
including parental leave and subsidised 
child care, should now make it easier to 
re-enter employment after childbirth or 
adoption.
An example of a confusing, and again 
highlighted, statement is that ‘parental 
benefits were introduced as a separate 
social programme which was available 
to women and men employees (gender-
neutral or at least transferable from 
mothers to fathers)’ (pp.57-8). We query 
this description of gender neutrality. For 
comparison, it is highly unlikely that 
a policy would be regarded as ‘gender 
neutral’ if the benefit went directly to the 
male partner in a heterosexual couple 
but was able to be transferred (if he so 
wished and it was mutually agreed) to 
his female partner. This current New 
Zealand policy configuration appears to 
be a double-edged sword for the goal of 
gender equity, as it attributes not only 
decision-making power to the mother, but 
also, by implication, the responsibility for 
child-rearing. It is therefore curious that 
this policy is sometimes perceived as a 
feminist policy (as discussed later). What 
Baker also fails to mention is that this 
transferable benefit disadvantages couples 
where the man is eligible through his 
work record but the woman is ineligible 
and thus unable to transfer the right to 
‘parental’ leave to him.
In relation to fathers’ rights to leave, 
Baker notes a case taken in Canada by a 
father who argued that biological fathers 
should have the same rights as adoptive 
fathers. It would have been useful if Baker 
had also mentioned the long campaign 
by New Zealand fathers’ groups to have 
equal rights with mothers to paid parental 
leave. In our 2006 Policy Quarterly article 
it was noted, for example, that ‘[a] 
formal complaint was also lodged with 
the Human Rights Commission on the 
grounds that the legislation discriminated 
against biological fathers, as they did 
not have an independent right to take a 
period of paid leave’.
In her discussion of men taking (or 
not taking) leave, Baker also fails to refer 
to the Department of Labour’s finding 
that most women do not want to pass 
on their parental leave. There are various 
reasons for this, including that most new 
mothers in New Zealand breastfeed in line 
with national and international health 
guidelines (Galtry, 2000). Although Baker 
mentions lactation once in the article, she 
does not engage with the complexity this 
poses for leave-sharing, especially when 
the duration of paid parental leave is 
relatively short, as in New Zealand.
Finally, on page 61 Baker mentions 
that mothers are less able than fathers 
to take on high-paying and secure jobs. 
But this assertion needs to be examined. 
Increasingly, women are better educated 
than men and many women now have 
partners who are less educated than 
themselves (Callister and Didham, 2010). 
Prior to their having children there are 
few constraints to women taking jobs 
that pay more than those of their male 
partners. This shows up in the lack of a 
significant gender pay gap among people 
under 30 years of age (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2010). 
The most significant pay gap occurs 
after women and men have children. 
What researchers and policy makers need 
to grapple with is why many women and 
men continue to adopt traditional gender 
roles once children are born. Instead, 
Baker portrays labour markets as being far 
friendlier to men than women. But, given 
changes in global employment, both men 
and women with low formal skills face 
major barriers to finding ‘decent’ work. 
This is one reason why, in a number of 
our own articles about parental leave, we 
suggest a universal payment, so that work 
history, which is increasingly uncertain 
for some groups, does not determine 
eligibility.
Lack of a coherent theory
In her introduction Baker claims that 
her article is written from a ‘feminist 
political economy perspective’. Later 
she notes the arguments put forward by 
‘feminists and progressive reformers’. 
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But the particular strain or strains of 
feminist theorising to which she refers 
are never clearly identified. One of the 
complexities of parental leave debates 
is that many feminist perspectives have 
been applied to them, ranging from clear-
cut arguments about the importance of 
‘equal treatment’ for women and men 
to equally strong views about the need 
to support ‘difference’, especially around 
pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding 
(Galtry, 2000). Baker uses a range of 
feminist perspectives but fails to outline 
clearly which she is using at any particular 
time. In addition, as already noted, a 
much clearer depiction of parental leave 
typologies would have been useful. The 
article could have usefully identified and 
examined, for example, the differing 
objectives and construction of various 
maternity/parental leave schemes 
and their gendered effects. Instead, it 
concludes with vague calls for policy 
that supports gender equity in both the 
workplace and the home. 
Conclusion
Debates about parental leave are 
important, especially in the period before 
an election. Parental leave is a critical 
component of any strategy for investing 
in children and requires rigorous 
analysis and debate. But through a lack 
of acknowledgement of past debates and 
unclear policy formulation, Baker’s article 
fails to take such discussions forward. It is 
a shame such an important opportunity 
was wasted. 
1 The Linked Employer-Employee Data Research Programme 
(LEED) is a multi-year project that is generating new research 
findings about workers and firms using linked employer and 
employee data. These data have been used to investigate a 
wide range of research questions, including re-entry to paid 
work for parents following a period of paid parental leave.
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